CO129-496 - Public Offices - 1926 — Page 31

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Fo

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4962/26.

dealing with the ships in question were adopted, viz. (1)

to seize and condemn them as prize; (2) to seize and de tain

them until the conclusion of the blockade and then to restore

them, and (3) merely to turn them back and prevent them

from entering the port. The possibility of serious trouble

would, of course, vary according as one or other of these

three courses were adopted.

3. It is clear, therefore, that even assuming that all the

interested Powers were willing to take joint action as proposed,

there would still be serious difficulties from the legal

point of view. In actual practice these difficulties would be

almost insuperable, for there could be no hope whatever of

securing the collaboration not merely of all the interested

Powers but even of the more important of them, especially

of the United States of America. This has been clearly

demonstrated by the attitude taken up by the Powers in regard

to the recent Customs incident at Canton. It is evident

from Sir R. Macleay's telegram No. 73 of February 24th, a

copy of which was sent to your department in Foreign Office letter No. F 801/1/10 of 26th February that the Powers

were most reluctant to undertake to take even the first step of preventing their national ships from loading and discharging cargo otherwise than through the Maritime Customs, and this, in a matter which, being as it was a threat to the Customs administration itself, was a direct and vital concern as much

to them as to His Majesty's Goverment.

4.

Mr. Secretary Amery will also have noted the statement

of the United States Minister reported in Sir R. Macleay's

telegram No. 78 of February 25th (see Foreign Office letter No. F 801/1/10 of 26th February) that the United States

Goverment would resent any attempt on the part of His

Majesty's /